Est. 2021  ·  Washington D.C.

THE ARCHITECTURE
OF MONEY IS BEING
REWRITTEN.
NOT BY ACCIDENT.

An independent research institute examining the structural transformation of monetary systems, capital formation, and the political economy of financial power.

Read the series → Nine working papers · 2025–2026

Working Paper Series

THE DOLLAR DISPLACEMENT THESIS

T.H. Thornton
No. 1

What GENIUS and CLARITY Actually Build

The GENIUS and CLARITY Acts do not regulate stablecoins. They institutionalise a private monetary layer beneath the Federal Reserve system, transferring money creation authority to entities with no public mandate and no lender-of-last-resort obligation.

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No. 2

Repercussions of the Dollar Displacement Architecture

The second-order effects of stablecoin dollarisation extend beyond monetary policy transmission. This paper maps the structural consequences for Treasury market depth, Federal Reserve balance sheet composition, and systemic liquidity in stress scenarios.

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No. 3

The Labor Vector: Gig Classification and the Stablecoin Compensation Pathway

Wage payment in stablecoins is not a fintech convenience. It is the mechanism by which gig-economy classification frameworks are extended into the monetary layer, severing worker compensation from regulated banking infrastructure.

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No. 4

The Rate Corridor Under Pressure: IOR, ON RRP, and the GENIUS Act

Stablecoin reserve requirements create a new competing demand for short-duration Treasuries and reserve-adjacent instruments, distorting the Fed's rate corridor mechanics at precisely the moment monetary policy transmission is already compromised.

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No. 5

Two Failures from One Decision: Credit Creation Collapse and the CBDC Foreclosure

The decision to route monetary infrastructure through private stablecoin issuers simultaneously contracts domestic credit creation and forecloses the sovereign digital currency option; two distinct failures that compound in any liquidity stress event.

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No. 6

The Hollow Bank: Regulatory Arbitrage, Competitive Displacement, and the Shrinking Insured System

As stablecoin issuers capture deposit-equivalent functions without deposit insurance obligations, the regulated banking sector faces structural competitive disadvantage; not from innovation, but from regulatory asymmetry that the GENIUS Act codifies rather than corrects.

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No. 7

The Permanent Record: Surveillance, Censorship, and the Architecture of Control in the Stablecoin Payment Layer

Programmable money is not neutral infrastructure. The same technical properties that enable stablecoin compliance also enable payment censorship, transaction surveillance, and the construction of a permanent, immutable financial record for every participant in the system.

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No. 8

The Accelerated Contradiction: Stablecoin Dollarisation and the Compounded Triffin Dilemma

The Triffin Dilemma described the inherent tension between the dollar's domestic and international roles. Stablecoin dollarisation does not resolve this tension; it accelerates it, exporting dollar-denominated monetary instability to jurisdictions with no voice in Federal Reserve policy decisions.

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No. 9

The Invisible Tax: Property Treatment, Compliance Burden, and the Hidden Cost Layer of Stablecoin Adoption

Current IRS property classification of stablecoins imposes a compliance architecture on everyday transactions that is invisible at the point of adoption and catastrophic at the point of audit; a hidden tax on the monetary infrastructure Congress is simultaneously mandating.

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Data in Context

STABLECOIN MARKET CAPITALISATION, 2018–2026

The Institute's thesis predates Congressional action. The trajectory was visible before the legislation. Source: DeFiLlama, May 2026.

Market cap 2018

~$3B

Market cap May 2026

$323.35B

Growth factor

100×+

Fellows

Research Fellows

THT · New York

Thomas H. Thornton

Former Chief Economist and Global Strategist; Silicon Valley venture capital, $20B+ AUM

DIF · London

Diana I. Fisher

Former Managing Director; European institutional asset management, long-duration sovereign capital

HEM · Washington D.C.

Henry E. Martyn

Senior Fellow Emeritus; three decades in multilateral development institutions and federal monetary policy

Forthcoming Fellows

AKM · Zurich

Adrian K. Menger

Insurance risk; compliance technology; AI-driven asset valuation

GWT · Bermuda

Gideon W. Tobin

Elite wealth structures; alternative asset protection; jurisdictional arbitrage

HSM · Singapore

Helena S. Myrdal

Capital flight; family offices; real-world asset policy integration

About

About the Cantillon Institute

The Cantillon Institute was established in 2021 to examine systemic transformations in monetary architecture before they achieve political consensus. The Institute publishes working papers, maintains a network of independent research fellows, and operates without institutional funding from the entities it examines.

The Institute's name references Richard Cantillon (c. 1680–1734), whose Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général established the foundational observation that monetary expansion benefits those closest to the source of new money before the broader price level adjusts; an effect now known as the Cantillon Effect.